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ABSTRACT 
The design of concession period for build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects is crucial to financial viability and 
completion risk management. A systematic analysis shows that concession period design involves the design 
of concession period structure as well as the determination of the concession period length. The concession 
period may have a single-period structure or a two-period structure; its length may be fixed or variable. 
Different designs reflect different risk control strategies for completion time overruns. The single-period 
concession structure requires the project company to assume completion risk, while the two-period 
concession structure could, to some extent, reduce the completion risk exposure to the project company, 
depending on the various parameters. Through Monte Carlo simulation, this paper evaluates the mean net 
present value (NPV), variance and NPV-at-risk of different concession period structures, so that both the 
government and the concessionaires can understand their risk exposure and rewards. The paper then analyzes 
the influence of project characteristics on concession period design to evaluate the feasibility of the design. 
Expected concession period has been calculated using Monte Carlo simulation method, and expected 
concession periods have been found to be 28.25 years and 26.46 years based on level of service and 95 % risk 
consideration. 
KEYWORDS: Concession period structure, NPV, Privately financed infrastructure, BOT, Risk 
management. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past two decades, a great number of 
infrastructure projects have been developed under 
concession contracts. According to the ninth annual 
survey conducted by Public Works Financing (2000), 
over 1370 infrastructure concessions, with estimated 
capital costs of over 575 billion US $, have been 
proposed, awarded or completed under various forms 
of public–private partnership in over 100 countries 
around the world since 1985. At the same time, a 
considerable number of studies on privately financed 
infrastructure projects have been presented in seminars, 
conferences and journals, which cover a wide range of 
topics from project evaluation, risk management and 
concession design to regulation. Among them, 
concession period design is an interesting topic of 
concern to both the public and private sectors and 
closely related to project participants’ financial returns 
and completion risk management. 
This paper systematically explores the types of 
concession structures for BOT projects and evaluates 
the effectiveness of different concession period 
structures on financial return and completion risk 
management through mathematical analysis and 
computer simulations. Finally, the paper recommends Accepted for Publication on 22/7/2013. 
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possible concession period structures for covering risk 
management. Different type BOT structures are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
 
Design of Concession Period 
The design of concession period involves the 
design of period structure; i.e., the determination of 
period length and incentive schemes. 
 
Structures of Concession Period 
The development of a privately financed 
infrastructure project goes through three phases; 
namely: the predevelopment phase, the construction 
phase and the operation phase. The pre-development 
phase ends with the award of a concession contract. 
Only the construction and operation phases are 
included in the concession period. Therefore, there are 
two possible period structures: 
 The single-period concession, which defines a 
concession period beginning from awarding the 
concession agreement to transferring the project 
back to the government; and 
 The two-period concession, which defines a 
construction period plus an operation period. 
The former combines the construction phase and 
operation phase together; whereas the latter separates 
the operation period from the construction period. The 
operation period may be fixed or variable depending on 
the nature of the contract. Fix operation period may not 
cover risk; whereas variable operation period may 
cover risk management of the BOT road project. 
 
Length of Concession Period 
Each concession has its duration, which may be 
fixed or variable. The choice depends on various risk 
factors such as: completion time, product prices and 
market demands. Usually, the concession has a fixed 
period, in which risk factors are managed monitoring 
vehicle tariff rate from time to time. Sometimes, the 
concession has a variable period, which may be 
extended if the specified risk factors are worse than 
expected or shortened if they are better than expected. 
For example, in order to deal with demand risk, the 
concession period can be varied according to the 
market demand. If the market demand is lower than 
expected, the concession period will be extended to 
allow the concessionaire to earn a reasonable return, 
and vice versa. Based on this concept, Engle et al. 
(1998) suggested the least-present-value of revenue 
method to determine the concession period of toll 
roads, so that the franchise length is adjusted 
endogenously to demand realization.  
As a result, single-period structures may have a 
fixed term or a variable term, and the construction 
period and the operation period in the two-period 
structure may each have a fixed term or a variable 
term. 
The length of concession period is mainly related to 
the recovery of investment and return required by the 
concessionaire. The general principle of determining 
the concession-period length is that the concession 
period should be long enough to allow the 
concessionaire to recoup investment costs and earn 
reasonable profits within that period (Smith, 1995). If 
the two-period concession structure is adopted, the 
contracted completion time is determined by both the 
contracting parties through bidding and/or negotiation 
by referring to the mean completion time or the most 
likely completion time of similar projects. It can be any 
time other than the mean completion time or the most 
likely completion time, as long as both parties agree. It 
is reasonable to assume the most likely completion 
time as the contracted completion time for the purpose 
of analysis in this paper. 
 
Concession Period Structures and Financial 
Viability 
The financial viability of a privately financed 
infrastructure project largely depends on the length of 
operation period. In a single-period concession 
structure, the operation period depends upon the 
completion of the project (Figure 1). It transfers the 
completion time risk to the project company. The 
project company will enjoy the gain generated from 
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tunnel project have been discussed. This includes five 
steps; namely: identifying the influential factors of 
concession period length determination, identifying the 
sub-influential factors, quantification of the factors, 
variable ranking and variable testing. The influential 
factors and sub-factors were identified through an 
extensive review of literature and a questionnaire 
survey. Then, qualitative factors were quantified, and 
all the factors were scaled and ranked by Entropy 
method and finally tested by a Support Vector Machine 
based prediction model. In the end, a set of key 
influential factors of concession period length was 
developed. It was expected that the developed factors 
can improve the accuracy and effectiveness of 
concession period length determination (Lam and  
Yung, 2013). 
The concession period is an important issue in the 
contractual arrangement of build-operate-transfer 
(BOT) projects, such as: highways, bridges and 
tunnels. In determining the concession period, it is 
predominantly the toll revenue and construction costs 
that affect how long the concessionaire needs to be in 
operation after the completion of the project. Stochastic 
revenue and cost model  are major factors to determine 
a concession period under multiple constraints in 
planning a BOT infrastructure project. The stochastic 
process is converted into an equivalent discrete form, 
and its parameters are estimated using historical data. 
Based on the process, a principle-agent problem is 
addressed as a solution to the conflict between the 
owner and the concessionaire. This methodology 
incorporates these stakeholders' interests in terms of 1) 
incentive constraints, and 2) participation constraints. 
In a case study, a numerical simulation has been carried 
out to assess the risk of toll revenue and construction 
costs when applied in practice, and to demonstrate the 
applicability of the stochastic revenue and cost model 
(Xu and Moon, 2013). 
A concession period is a key decision variable in 
the arrangement of a build-operate-transfer (BOT)-type 
contract. Recently, an innovative BOT concession 
model (BOTCcM) was developed to quantitatively 
determine the value of a concession period. The model 
could propose an interval for possible negotiations 
between a host government and a private investor. 
Nevertheless, this paper identifies a major limitation of 
this model and proposes an alternative model for 
improvement. Under a BOT arrangement, the project 
becomes a property of the host government upon its 
transfer. The project’s net asset value at the transfer 
time is usually significantly greater than zero, 
representing revenue to the host government. This 
revenue, thus, cannot be ignored. However, this 
revenue was not considered in the analysis of 
BOTCcM. This study improves the second critical 
point in BOTCcM by considering project net asset 
value at the transfer time. The application of the new 
model is demonstrated by using the same example case 
quoted in BOTCcM and shows that a significantly 
different decision will be made when project net asset 
value at its transfer time is considered (Shen et al., 
2012). 
Many US transportation public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) are based on the concession model, under which 
the structure of user fees and the agreement duration 
are central to ensure a fair balance of risk and reward 
between the public and private participants. Yet, 
previous studies of toll-rate structuring and concession-
length determination have treated these two variables 
largely independently. Toll charges, for instance, are 
typically established as either supply-based, linked to 
the cost of constructing, maintaining and/or operating 
the facility; or demand-based, adjusted to influence 
driver behavior in certain ways such as through 
variable time-of-day congestion charges. Concession 
lengths are designed separately to enable tax-
depreciation advantages for the private sector and/or to 
mitigate traffic-demand risk. Considering these two 
variables together, though, provides new opportunities 
to improve the risk-and-reward profile for both 
partners. A review and comparative analysis of dual-
variable approaches, illustrated by projects in which 
these strategies have been used, offer additional tools 
to consider in structuring future PPP procurements 
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(Gross and Garvin, 2009). 
Long-term concession agreements as a kind of 
Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) have been applied in 
infrastructure projects with equity participation by 
private sector. The concession approach to project 
financing has many advantages over traditional 
methods and as many concerns with non-traditional 
techniques. The growth of demand on financing 
infrastructure projects with public sector makes these 
projects deliver to the private sector throughout long-
term concession agreements. Long-term concession is 
to cover infrastructure gap, reduce public concerns and 
protect the public interest on one hand and, on the other 
hand, to encourage private initiative and benefit from 
the involvement of the private sector particularly in the 
designing, building, financing, operating and 
maintenance of infrastructure projects. The most 
important criteria of long-term concessions in the 
structure of matrix are represented in four approaches: 
public objective, project properties, project 
implementation and environmental conditions. It is 
shown that various terms of contract can be 
investigated by considering these criteria in two 
infrastructure case studies of initial concessions in the 
United States (Farshchian et al., 2012). 
The output of simulations was the cumulative 
distribution of NPV. Besides the mean value and the 
variance, the results were also analyzed by using the 
NPV-at-risk method developed by Ye and Tiong 
(2000a), which is defined as a particular NPV that is 
generated from a project at some specific confidence 
level. According to the method, the NPV-at-risk with a 
95% confidence level was used as one of the indicators 
of the concession period design performance. 
Model Concession of Agreement, Government of 
India recommended that a road shall be constructed at 
level of service B and concession may be terminated at 
level of service C /D depending on the concession 
agreement (MCA, 2009). 
Bagui and Ghosh (2009) studied and designed a 
concession period considering various aspects; namely: 
level of service and financial internal rate of return. 
Upper and lower limits of concession periods have 
been fixed and the expected concession period has been 
determined using Monte Carlo simulation method. 
 
Limitations 
Concession period has been designed based on 
concession model agreement, Government of India, 
level of service and NPV at 95 % risk. The concession 
period depends on other parameters, like: actual 
construction cost, actual traffic and delay in 
construction. 
 
OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
 
Based on previous studies and needs of research, 
concession period shall be determined considering 
other major risks of the project; i.e., considering risk 
management so that the concessionaire shall benefit 
from the project. 
Based on this objective, the scope of work has been 
identified as follows: 
 Adopting fix and variable concession period; 
 Covering risk by adjusting toll rate for fixed 
concession period; 
 Covering risk by adjusting concession period; and 
 Adjusting concession period for traffic risk and 
construction cost risk. 
 
Proposed Methodology for Concession Period 
Initial concession period shall be fixed based on the 
following two criteria: 
- Concession period based on level of services. 
- Concession period based on NPV/FIRR: 
a) Concession period at NPV≥0, FIIR≥ discount 
rate. 
b) Concession period based on NPV at 95% risk. 
 
Concession Period Covering Risk Management 
Major risks are: 
 Delay in construction period; 
 Variation in construction cost; 
 Variation in traffic; 
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 Financing methods and supply; and  
 Contracting challenges.  
In the proposed method of designing concession 
period, different risks mentioned above should be 
protected so that the project is taken by the 
concessionaire. 
A hypothetical case study has been considered for 
finalizing the concession period of a project covering 
the following risks: 
1- Concession period will be reviewed if delaying 
construction is due to Government’s fault, like: 
delay in land acquisition, delay in utility shifting, 
environment and forest clearance; i.e., Government 
involvement. 
2- Project has been bided based on project cost fixed 
by the Government with ± 5 % cost variation. 
Concession period will be increased or decreased if 
variation of cost is more than ± 5 % (generally up to 
15% or more). 
3- Concession period will be revised if variation in 
traffic is more than ± 5 % of the projected traffic 
(generally up to 15%). 
The concession period of the case study has been 
determined adopting the considerations stated above. 
 
CASE STUDY 
 
A hypothetical case study has been considered for 
bypass construction. Original existing road is a 56 km 
long road passing through a congested urban area (20 
km), and the road will be upgraded to six lanes with the 
provision of a new six lane bypass and a total length of 
the road of 50 km. 
The financial analysis has been carried out to 
evaluate the financial strength of the project from an 
investor's point of view. Obviously, the exercise 
presumes that the project is an economically viable 
option. In this exercise, all the costs and the benefits 
are based on the market prices. 
 
Costs 
The costs to be considered for commercial viability 
analysis consist of:  
 Base cost of construction; 
 Annual and periodic repair and maintenance cost; 
 Toll administration cost. 
Base Construction Cost: The cost for the 
construction of the road has been calculated and found 
to be Rs 7500 million (1 USD =55 Indian Rupees), 
including cost of antiglare screen barrier which is 
assumed to be installed on the median of the road. 
Operation and Maintenance Costs (O & M 
Costs): Operation and maintenance costs are major 
expenses for the road project under BOT format during 
the operation period of the project. These consist of 
two costs; i.e., maintenance cost and toll operation cost 
which are described separately. 
Maintenance Cost: This includes annual 
maintenance cost and periodic maintenance cost. 
Aannual maintenance cost is taken as Rs 12.5 million 
(repair of potholes, cracks, patches, cleaning of 
structure… etc.) and the periodic strengthening overlay 
is of the functional type required for roughness 
improvement. Periodic overlay is applied periodically 
(normally required every five years). Periodic 
maintenance cost is considered as Rs 190 million. 
 
Operation Cost: This consists of the following: 
 Salary of all employed people for collection of toll; 
and 
 Maintenance charge of computer system, 
generators’ cost, electric bills, ticket printing 
charges… etc. 
Administrative toll cost has been taken as Rs 6 
million per year. 
An annual inflation has been calculated based on 
Consumer Price Index. 
Discount Rate: In the real world, the currency 
value usually depreciates year by year. Accordingly, 
the value of time should not be neglected. The discount 
rate has been determined by the interest rate of the 
long/ medium-term loan, the return on equity and the 
debt / equity ratio (Chen, 1998). 
It has been presented in the following equation:  
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Discount Rate = Debt proportion × Debt interest rate+ 
Equity proportion × Return on Equity 
In the present study, interest rate of debt and return 
on equity have been adopted 15 % and 20%, 
respectively, based on the present market scenario in 
India. Financial analysis has been carried out and 
financial parameters are plotted graphically varying 
equity from 10% to 90% and varying traffic / revenue 
from 60% to 100 % of the base traffic. 
Debt Repayment Schedule: Debt repayment 
schedule has been adopted as 10 years. 
Base Traffic: Tollable traffic has been considered 
and base year traffic is reported in Table 1. 
Table 1. Base Year Traffic 
Vehicle Number 
Car (NT)N 2146 
Car (OT) 2300 
Bus 281 
Light Commercial Vehicle +MINI BUS 1116 
2-Axled Truck 2977 
3-Axled Truck 5359 
Multi-Axled Truck 1382 
Growth Rate: Table 2 shows the growth rate of 
vehicle mode. 
 
Table 2. Growth Rate of Vehicles 
Vehicle Type Growth Rate (%) 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015 onwards 
Car (NT) 9.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 
Car (OT) 9.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 
Bus 7.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Light  Vehicle +MINI BUS 7.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
2-Axled Truck 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
3-Axled Truck 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Multi-Axled Truck 7.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 
Toll Rate: Toll rate vehicle mode has been fixed by 
the Government of India and is presented in Table 3. 
Toll rate shall be revised @ 5 - 8.3 % in consultation 
with the concessionaire and client. Per km rate is also 
varied depending on cost of project and type of project. 
Rate is too much for tunnels, bridges, elevated 
highways and flyover  projects. 
 
Table 3. Toll Rate 
Vehicle Type 
Toll Rate (Rs / km) 
in 2010 by NHAI 
Car, van ,jeep 0.89 
LCV 1.56 
Bus, Truck, Heavy truck 3.12 
MAV 5 
 
Concession Period: Concession period consists of 
two parts. These are: construction period and operation 
period. Construction period has been considered 3 
years and operation period has been adopted 27 years. 
Escalation Rate: Escalation rate has been adopted 
6% to determine Total Project Cost (TPC). 
 
Interest Rate during Construction: Interest rate 
has been considered 15% to determine TPC. 
 
DETERMINATION OF CONCESSION PERIOD 
 
Concession Period Based on Level of Service 
Indian Roads Congress (IRC) 64:1990 is the basic 
guideline for capacity analysis of roads. 
IRC :64-1990  recommended that  capacity of four 
lane dual carriageway with paved shoulders is 40,000 
Passenger Car Units (PCU) at Level of Service (LoS) 
B. The value may be increased by 40% and 80% for 
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LoS C and LoS D, respectively. Capacity of six lane 
dual carriageway with paved shoulders is 60,000 PCU 
at Level of Service (LoS) B and 108,000 PCU at LoS 
D. 
The proposed growth factors of vehicles have been 
reported in Table 4. PCU of left and right carriageways 
and total PCU are presented in Tables 5 and 6. From 
Table 6, it is found that the capacity of the road is 
found to be 108,000 PCU between 2037 and 2038. 
Therefore, concession period will be terminated at 
2038 when the road reaches LoS D. Concession period 
is found 29 years based on technical viability (Level of 
service D, Concession period=2038-2010+1=29 years 
approximately). Concession period will be reduced to 
24 years for LoS C considering  PCU of 85102 close to 
84000 in year 2033 (Concession period=2033-
2010+1=24 years approximately). 
 
Table 4. Proposed Growth Factor 
Years BUS LCV 2-AXLE 3-AXLE MAV Taxi 
2011-2015 5.16 7.5 5.38 7.47 8.3 5 
2016-2020 5 5.5 5 5.47 6.3 5 
2021-2025 5 5 5 5 5 5 
>2005 5 5 5 5 5 5 
PCU 3 1.5 3 3 4.5 1 
 
CONCESSION PERIOD BASED ON NPV/FIRR 
 
Concession Period Based on NPV Zero 
Minimum concession period is obtained when NPV 
is 0 or the discount rate is equal to financial internal 
rate of return. Financial analysis has been carried out 
taking different viable equity portions into account, and 
the concession period has been calculated at FIRR is 
equal to discount rate. These data are plotted and 
presented in Fig.3. From this figure, it is found that the 
concession period increased with increasing the 
proportion of equity. Maximum equity proportion is 
found to be 25 % and concession period is found to be 
30 years. Concession period is found 29 years based on 
technical viability of the project; i.e., based on level of 
service D. Financial internal rate of return is found 
16.16%; i.e., same as discount rate and NPV is equal to 
zero at equity 23.2%. Project is not viable for the case 
of equity more than 23.2 %. 
Discount rate and FIRR with different equities are 
plotted in Fig. 3. Discount rate line separates feasible 
zone and infeasible zone of equity. Form Fig. 3, it is 
found that the maximum equity limit is 23.2 % and that 
the project is infeasible for the case of equity more than 
23.2 %. 
Allowable concession period is 29 years and 
maximum equity investment is 23 % (say). 
Considering both aspects, the concession period has 
been adopted as 29 years and the maximum equity is 
found 23.2 % (Fig. 4). 
The concessionaire covers the probability risk of 
the project by limiting its equity proportion. Generally, 
equity portion varies  from 10 %  to 30 % for a BOT 
project. 
The concessionaire may propose 15 % equity 
(Generally recommended by the Government of a 
Country) for the base case (base traffic and base cost). 
NPV and FIRR (Equity) have been found Rs 750 
million and 17.34 %. Discount rate at 15% equity is 
15.75 %. Therefore, equity has been considered 15% 
for the case study. 
 
Concession Period Covering Construction Cost Risk 
and Traffic Risk 
Actual construction cost may be increased/ 
decreased depending on the actual execution of the 
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work. Actual cost varies within ± 15% of the base cost 
in scenario analysis. 
Concession period may be increased to between 30 
and 31 years. The project is infeasible if the actual 
project cost exceeds the base cost by 15% or more. In 
this case, the concession period will be 30.2 years for 
the case of variable concession period. 
 
 
Table 5. PCU of Left Carriageway 
Year BUS LCV 2-AXLE 3-AXLE MAV Taxi PCU (LHS) 
2010 105 372 1028 1699 424 1310 12272 
2011 110 400 1083 1826 459 1419 13144 
2012 116 430 1142 1962 497 1536 14079 
2013 122 462 1203 2109 539 1664 15083 
2014 124 475 1227 2167 555 1802 15570 
2015 131 511 1293 2329 601 1952 16684 
2016 137 539 1358 2457 639 2114 17654 
2017 144 568 1426 2591 679 2289 18682 
2018 152 600 1497 2733 722 2479 19773 
2019 159 633 1572 2882 768 2685 20928 
2020 167 667 1651 3040 816 2908 22154 
2021 175 701 1733 3192 857 3149 23357 
2022 184 736 1820 3352 900 3410 24629 
2023 193 773 1911 3519 945 3694 25973 
2024 203 811 2006 3695 992 4000 27394 
2025 213 852 2107 3880 1041 4332 28895 
2026 224 894 2212 4074 1094 4692 30483 
2027 235 939 2322 4278 1148 5081 32162 
2028 247 986 2439 4491 1206 5503 33938 
2029 259 1035 2560 4716 1266 5960 35816 
2030 272 1087 2689 4952 1329 6454 37804 
2031 286 1141 2823 5199 1396 6990 39907 
2032 300 1199 2964 5459 1465 7570 42133 
2033 315 1258 3112 5732 1539 8198 44489 
2034 331 1321 3268 6019 1616 8879 46984 
2035 347 1387 3431 6320 1696 9616 49627 
2036 365 1457 3603 6636 1781 10414 52425 
2037 383 1530 3783 6968 1870 11278 55390 
2038 402 1606 3972 7316 1964 12214 58532 
2039 422 1686 4171 7682 2062 13228 61862 
2040 443 1771 4379 8066 2165 14326 65391 
2041 465 1859 4598 8469 2273 15515 69134 
2042 489 1952 4828 8893 2387 16803 73102 
2043 513 2050 5070 9337 2506 18197 77312 
2044 539 2152 5323 9804 2632 19708 81778 
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Table 6. PCU of Right Carriageway and Total PCU 
Year BUS LCV 2-AXLE 3-AXLE MAV Taxi PCU(RHS) PCU Total 
2010 91 335 1030 1700 424 1500 12374 24646 
2011 96 360 1085 1827 459 1575 13206 26350 
2012 101 387 1144 1963 497 1654 14096 28175 
2013 106 416 1205 2110 539 1736 15048 30131 
2014 108 428 1230 2169 555 1823 15482 31052 
2015 113 460 1296 2331 601 1914 16529 33213 
2016 119 485 1361 2458 639 2010 17427 35081 
2017 125 512 1429 2593 679 2111 18374 37057 
2018 131 540 1500 2734 722 2216 19373 39146 
2019 138 570 1575 2884 768 2327 20427 41355 
2020 145 601 1654 3042 816 2443 21538 43692 
2021 152 631 1736 3194 857 2566 22615 45972 
2022 160 663 1823 3354 900 2694 23746 48375 
2023 168 696 1914 3521 945 2828 24933 50906 
2024 176 731 2010 3697 992 2970 26179 53573 
2025 185 767 2111 3882 1041 3118 27488 56384 
2026 194 805 2216 4076 1094 3274 28863 59346 
2027 204 846 2327 4280 1148 3438 30306 62468 
2028 214 888 2443 4494 1206 3610 31821 65759 
2029 225 932 2565 4719 1266 3790 33412 69229 
2030 236 979 2694 4955 1329 3980 35083 72887 
2031 248 1028 2828 5203 1396 4179 36837 76744 
2032 260 1079 2970 5463 1465 4388 38679 80812 
2033 273 1133 3118 5736 1539 4607 40613 85102 
2034 287 1190 3274 6023 1616 4838 42644 89628 
2035 301 1249 3438 6324 1696 5080 44776 94402 
2036 316 1312 3610 6640 1781 5334 47015 99440 
2037 332 1378 3790 6972 1870 5600 49365 104756 
2038 348 1446 3980 7320 1964 5880 51834 110366 
2039 366 1519 4179 7686 2062 6174 54425 116287 
2040 384 1595 4388 8071 2165 6483 57146 122538 
2041 403 1674 4607 8474 2273 6807 60004 129137 
2042 424 1758 4838 8898 2387 7147 63004 136106 
2043 445 1846 5079 9343 2506 7505 66154 143466 
2044 467 1938 5333 9810 2632 7880 69462 151240 
 
In case the concession period is fixed to 29 years, 
toll rate adjustment will be carried out. Basic toll rate 
of vehicle mode has been increased to 3%, and FIRR 
and NPV are found 15.76 % and Rs 2 million, 
respectively, when the project cost increases by + 15%. 
Variations of FIRR and NPV at other construction cost 
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variations are presented in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. 
Other variations occur in the worst case when the 
construction cost increases by 15 % and the traffic 
decreases by 15%. This is shown in Fig. 7. For the case 
of variable concession period, the concession period 
will be adjusted when the actual cost increases by more 
than 15% of the base cost. There is no need for the 
adjustment of concession period for other two cases 
presented in Fig. 7 (base cost case and 85% of the base 
cost case). Toll rate will be adjusted for the case of 
fixing the concession period at 29 years. Toll rate 
adjustment is shown in Fig. 8. 
 
 
Figure 3: Variation of FIRR and Discount Rate with Varying Equity 
 
 
Figure 4: Variation of Concession Period at Discount Rate Equal to FIRR or NPV Zero 
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Figure 5: Variation of FIRR at a Concession Period of 29 Years with Varying Cost with Base Traffic 
 
Figure 6: Variation of NPV at a Concession Period of 29 Years with Varying Cost with Base Traffic 
 
Concession Period Based on NPV at 95 % Risk 
Concession period will be based on NPV at 95% 
risk. NPV at 95% risk with different coefficients of 
variations is found to be Rs 690, 630, 570 and 510 
million for coefficients of variation of 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 
and 0.20, respectively. Concession periods have been 
calculated for NPV of Rs 690, 630, 570 and 510 
million and concession periods have been tabulated in 
Table 7 for an adopted equity of 15%. 
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Figure 7: Variation of FIRR at a Concession Period of 29 Years with Varying Traffic and Cost 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Toll Rate Adjustment 
   
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15
FI
RR
 (%
)
Actual Traffic in Term of Base Traffic
1.15 Base cost Base Cost 0.85 Base Cost
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15
In
cr
ea
se
 Ba
si
c T
ol
l R
ta
e  (
%
)
Actual Traffic  in Term of Base Traffic
Design of Concession…                                                                                      Swapan Kumar Bagui and Ambarish Ghosh 
 
- 414 - 
Table 7. Concession Period NPV at 95 % Risk 
 
NPV 
(Rs million) 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Concession 
Period (Year) 
FIRR 
(%) 
740 0.010 28.94 17.30 
720 0.025 28.82 17.15 
690 0.050 28.26 17.10 
630 0.100 28.13 17.05 
570 0.150 27.89 16.95 
510 0.200 27.54 16.86 
 
Concession period selected by these methods does 
not cover the various risks involved in a BOT project. 
There are several risks in a BOT project. These are: 
traffic risk and construction cost risk.  
 
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION TECHNIQUE 
FOR EXPECTED CONCESSION PERIOD 
 
Concession periods obtained using various methods 
are presented in previous sections. These vary widely. 
Therefore, the expected concession period has been 
calculated using Monte Carlo Simulation Technique. 
The Monte Carlo Simulation Technique (MCST) is 
based on the generation of multiple trials to determine 
the expected values of random variables. The basis of 
this method is presented by the following relationship: 
 
defined value 
 
                                                                                 (1) 
where 
σ = Standard deviation of the random variable;  
N = Number of iterations; 
 Actual value; and 
 = Average value. 
There are numerous commercial packages that run 
Monte Carlo Simulation; however a basic spreadsheet 
program can be used to run the simulation. In this case, 
the generation of multiple trials has been implemented 
by propagating a basic formula as many times as the 
number of iterations required by the model. 
Expected value has been determined using Monte 
Carlo Simulation Technique, assuming that an activity 
has two probable ranges of values (upper limit and 
lower limit). 
The general scheme of Monte Carlo Simulation 
Technique is as follows: 
 Generation of  random values of each range of 
concession periods obtained using various methods 
as stated above; 
 Addition of each series of random variable values 
to determine the average value; and 
 The expected concession period has been obtained 
as the average value of random values. 
 
Determination of the Number of Iterations 
Monte Carlo Simulation Technique provides an 
estimate of the expected value of random variable and 
also predicts the estimation error, which is proportional 
to the number of iterations. 
 
The total error  is given by: 
 
                                (2) 
 
where 
 
σ = Standard deviation of the random variable; and 
N = Number of iterations. 
An upper bound of standard deviation can be 
estimated by calculating the standard deviation 
between maximum, minimum and average values of 
random variables. 
Expected concession period has been determined 
using Monte Carlo Simulation Technique (with 2 % 
error). Expected values with probable errors have been 
calculated and are presented in Table 8. 
  
  
  NN N
 31Pr



N
 3
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Table 8. Expected Concession Period 
Method Expected Concession Period (Year) Error (%) FIRR (%) 
Concession Period at 95% Risk Method 28.25 0.12 17.10 
Based on LoS C and LoS D for base case 26.46 1.49 17.45 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The design of concession period not only addresses 
the relationship between the construction period and 
the operation period, but also deals with time-overrun 
risk in project construction. Different concession 
period structures expose the project company to 
different levels of completion risk and have different 
impacts on financial viability. After all, the choice of 
appropriate period structures and effective incentive 
schemes is largely based on risk–return trade-off of the 
contracting parties. A well-designed concession period 
can create a ‘win-win’ solution for both project 
promoter and the host government. Based on the 
present study, the following conclusions may be 
drawn: 
 Initial concession period may be fixed satisfying 
that both level of service and time period for NPV 
are equal to zero condition. This is the maximum 
concession period. The maximum concession 
period has been calculated as 29 years and 24 years 
for levels of services D and C, respectively. 
 Concession period may be determined based on 
NPV at 95% risk varying coefficients of variation 
from 0.01 to 0.20 or more. Concession period 
decreases with increasing the coefficient of 
variation. 
 Net present value and financial internal rate of 
return vary linearly with a negative slope with 
equity. 
 Feasible rage of equity may be determined using 
FIRR, discount rate vs. equity graphs. Maximum 
limit of equity for this case study has been found 
23.2%. 
 Maximum concession period at NPV is zero varies 
with equity linearly with a positive slope according 
to the equation: 
Concession period= 0.454 ×Equity, R2=0.999 
 For the base case, financial internal rate of return 
increases with increasing base traffic linearly with a 
positive slope and vice versa as shown in Fig.7. 
 Project may be viable by adjusting toll rate for the 
case of increasing project cost / decreasing base 
traffic or both as shown in Fig.8. 
 Expected concession period has been determined 
using Monte Carlo Simulation Technique, and 
expected concession periods have been found to be 
28.25 years and 26.46 years based on 95 % risk 
consideration and level of service. 
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Appendix 1. Different BOT Formats 
BOT Format Description 
 BOT; Build, Operate and Transfer A private party or concessionaire retains a concession for a fixed period from a public party, 
called principal (client), for the development and 
operation of a public facility. 
The most important advantages of BOT are: 
utilization of private sector's investment instead of 
public sector's investment, transferring all the risk 
to private sector, transferring technical knowledge 
as one of the most important benefits of this 
method for developing countries, in addition to 
that political resistance in using the private sector 
is less than in other methods because the project 
will be owned by the government finally. 
Disadvantages: These kinds of projects are very 
complicated from the viewpoint of technical and 
financial issues and need high-level experts and 
consultants, increasing expenditures of users in 
operation time, contrast between benefits of 
private sector and public sector.  
 DBFOT; Design, Build, Finance, Operate 
and Transfer 
 
 
 
 
 BOOT; Build, Own, Operate and Transfer 
A contract under the principles of the private 
finance initiative, whereby the same supplier 
undertakes the design and construction of an asset 
and thereafter maintains it for an extended period, 
often 25 or 30 years. Advantages and 
disadvantages are similar to those of BOT. 
Projects of the Build, Own, Operate and Transfer 
(BOOT) type involve a private developer; 
financing, building, owning and operating a 
facility for a specified period. At the expiration of 
the specified period, the facility is returned to the 
Government.  
Advantages: This method could have benefits for 
public and private sectors, such as: strong financial 
incentives for the BOOT operator, transferring 
construction and long-term operating risks onto the 
BOOT provider, risk mitigation through the 
involvement of multiple participants, increasing the 
project certainty and early interest recovering 
through involving a BOOT operator, encouraging 
maximum innovation allowing to have the most 
efficient designs, high accountability for the asset 
design, construction and service delivery due to 
recovery of expenditures and enhancing BOOT 
operators and project management knowledge 
through experience, minimal costs of company 
structuring matters. 
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Disadvantages: The defects of this model are 
described as: higher cost for the end user due to the 
BOOT provider accountability of 100 percent 
financing and on-going maintenance, negative 
reaction of community to private sector 
involvement, not realizable full benefits of economic 
development, a sole sourced BOOT provider, time 
consuming and resource hungry management and 
monitoring of the operating contract with the BOOT 
operators, requirement of a rigorous selection 
process in selecting a BOOT partner. 
 BOO; Build, Own and Operate 
The Build, Own and Operate (BOO) project 
operates similarly to a BOOT project, except that 
the private sector owns the facility in perpetuity. 
Advantages and disadvantages are similar to those 
of a BOT project. 
Private sector entity will have responsibility for 
financing and constructing the building or facility 
and maintaining and servicing it throughout the 
contract term. It is used mainly for the 
construction of new buildings. 
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